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DLD-363

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 07-2072
_______________
STANLEY BETHEA,
Appellant,
v.
NATION OF ISLAM;
LOUIS FARRAKHAN;
TYNNETTA MUHAMMAD
___________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-01492)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
___________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 30, 2007
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: September 12, 2007 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________

PER CURIAM
Stanley Bethea, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 240 (3d
Cir. 2004). We will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
On August 1, 2006, Bethea submitted a complaint under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, alleging
that the Nation of Islam, Louis Farrakhan, and Tynnetta Muhammad (“the defendants”)
racially discriminated against him when they failed to hire him to lead the Nation of
Islam.1 The District Court issued a summons and the defendants were served with the
complaint. The District Court then granted Bethea’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint on the condition that the amended complaint “stand on its own.” Bethea
submitted an amended complaint that failed to conform to the District Court’s directive,
and the District Court dismissed the amended complaint. After denying Bethea’s motion
to file a second amended complaint, the District Court ordered that the case would
proceed on the original complaint.
On April 5, 2007, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Bethea’s complaint for
failure to state a cognizable claim. The District Court determined that Bethea could not
proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment because the defendants are neither state actors
nor did they act under color of state law. See Edmunson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,

1

Bethea claims that he is the “best and only qualified leader of the Nation of Islam”
because he is the reincarnation of Fard Muhammad and Elijah Muhammad.
2

500 U.S. 614, 620-22 (1991) (explaining state actor and state action standards). Bethea
was also precluded from proceeding on an employment discrimination claim under 42
U.S.C.§1981 or §1982 because the First Amendment’s ministerial exception “bar[red]
any claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution’s right to select who
will perform particular spiritual functions.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307
(3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the District Court noted that § 1982, which prohibits all racial
discrimination with respect to housing, does not apply to employment discrimination
claims such as Bethea’s. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (securing the right of all citizens to
“inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property).
Bethea timely appealed from the District Court’s order of dismissal, and because
he is now proceeding in forma pauperis, we must determine whether this appeal should be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An appeal is considered frivolous if
it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989).
Generally, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
after service of process only if the plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to respond. See
Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 430 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990). However, although
disfavored, a sua sponte dismissal may stand even if the plaintiff is not provided notice
and an opportunity to respond where it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that
any amendment would be futile. Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir. 2002); see
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also Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (“No error . . . by the court . . . is ground for disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice.”). Here, although service of process was completed, the District Court
did not provide Bethea with an opportunity to be heard regarding the possibility of
dismissal. Nevertheless, Bethea was given an opportunity to amend his complaint, and
this is the rare case where a sua sponte dismissal should stand because it is “crystal clear”
that Bethea cannot prevail, as the allegations, “‘taken in the light most favorable to
[Bethea], are patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption.’” Id. (citing
Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)); see also
Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1989). Although our precedent
disfavors the procedural shortcuts that the District Court took in dismissing Bethea’s
complaint, its analysis of the complaint’s viability – or lack thereof – is correct.
Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B).
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